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Despite its relative youth, computer science has become a well-
established discipline, granting over 2% of the bachelors degrees in the
United States (U.S. Department of Education, 2010). For this reason,
it is important that we understand the nature of computer science
and the likely direction for the development of inquiry in computer
science in the future. This paper examines several perspectives on
the nature of the methods of computer science inquiry. These are
empiricist methods, rationalist methods, and an engineering stance.
It argues that empiricist and rationalist stances play identifiable roles
in the scientific nature of computer science reasoning but that the
engineering stance does not. Following the trend in the maturation of
other sciences, this paper recommends an overhaul in computer science
curricula.
1 Identifying Science: Necessary and Su cient Con-
ditions
Physics, chemistry, biology, psychology: these are all unequivocally scien-
tific fields. Labeling a field as scientific means that it aims at methodically
producing formal or empirical knowledge claims. At the same time, by a x-
ing the honorific of ‘science’ to some field, we are saying that its knowledge
claims advance toward truth. Other fields include soil science, materials
science, packaging science, computer science, information science, library
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science, political science, food science, creation science, forensic science,
military science, and “the dismal science.” Is there a nature to scientific
inquiry, such that some or most of these are legitimate sciences while others
fail to meet the epistemic ideal which entitles them to be ‘sciences’?
The demarcation problem of science is the question of how to distinguish
between fields that claim to do science and those that legitimately do. This
problem is not so easily answered: to distinguish between science and non-
science, it is evident that we need a definition which will allow us to specify
some set of fields which are all considered science. At the same time, it
should leave out no scientific field, and similarly, should not let in any non-
scientific field. To put it succinctly, our definition should keep science (as
we consider it) in and non-science out. This is the requirement that any set
of demarcating criteria must be both necessary and su cient.
As it was first described by Aristotle, science is the field of inquiry that
examines first causes (Aristotle, 1994). This meant that a scientific discipline
examined not the ‘what’ of some phenomenon, but the ‘how’, and such
a discipline almost never examined the ‘why.’ This description of science
held until its practicality was reconsidered. Under the Aristotelian view of
science, something like astronomy could not be considered science because
it is merely descriptive and first causes are not considered. In other words,
astronomy only categorized and catalogued the stars, took note of ‘what’ was
out there — it did not answer the ‘how.’ Later, conceptions for what makes
something ‘scientific’ began to change, and the idea that there could be a
scientific approach to something (such as early astronomy) was becoming
accepted (Peirce, 1957).
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One more specific goal of demarcation is to identify pseudo-science. The
demarcation project also seeks to distinguish natural science from other
legitimate and related means of knowledge production, such as social science,
engineering, and medicine. To say a field is non-science is not necessarily to
make the claim that it is not producing knowledge. However, it may be a
claim about how that discipline is going about knowledge production.
The main angle of approach when it comes to demarcating science has
been to identify certain demarcation criteria. The idea here is to come
up with a single set of criteria that is both necessary and su cient. One
such criterion, proposed by Karl Popper, is that of falsifiability : scientific
theories must be able to be falsified. An objection to falsifiability is raised
by Larry Laudan where he claims that with Popper’s falsifiability criteria,
we are forced to acknowledge as scientific “every crank claim which makes
ascertainably false assertions”(Laudan, 1983, 121).1 At first, this objection
seems completely o↵ target: Laudan seems to be making the claim that
because something has been falsified, it is not science, nor was it ever. This
objection is based on certain conceptions about how science is done and is
really a methodological objection. Laudan is making the claim that just
because a piece of knowledge can be falsified, that does not make it science.
How we arrived at that piece of knowledge is the relevant consideration for
determining whether or not it is science.
Other attempts to demarcate science, such as that by Thagard (1978),
1It is interesting to note the subtle distinction between claims that can be scientific if
we are willing to reject them and the same reformulated claims that cannot because we
do not have the same willingness. Does this reflect a certain attitude which makes some
endeavors scientific? Or at least an attitude which makes some people scientific?
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seek to define science as always progressing. Most pseudoscience, such as
astrology, have given up on proposing and testing new claims. The criterion
is insu cient, though, as it admits ufology into the fold (Laudan, 1983).
Furthermore, it is not clear whether the progressive nature of an area of
inquiry is always easily identifiable. Whether or not a field is ‘progressing’
must be determined within the field itself and may not always be clear to
an outside observer.
A strong candidate for an acceptable demarcating principle comes from
David B. Resnik, who argues that it is unrealistic to expect a solution to the
demarcation problem to provide necessary and su cient conditions (Resnik,
2000). Instead, he suggests that the best we can do “is to provide a list
of criteria that we associate with disciplines, theories, methods, concepts,
or people that we call scientific” (Resnik, 2000, 257). He brings to light
practical reasons for considering the demarcation problem, such as public
education, medicine, engineering, research funding, and others. In order
to answer the demarcation problem, claims Resnik, we must know who is
trying to distinguish between science and non-science, as well as why that
distinction is wished for. In this way, a consequentialist approach is taken:
i.e., the consequences of making a wrong distinction are taken into account
when setting up the stringency for evaluating a given field.
This view opens itself up to criticism because of its contextualist ap-
proach — in a way, calling something a science under Resnik’s pragmatic
scheme does not tell us much about the nature of any particular discipline.
To understand what it means to call something science in this pragmatic
sense means we must ask a follow-up question: given the stakes, does the
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discipline satisfy enough conditions for it to sit well? This is problematic
because the term science itself has now lost its meaning. We have given
up on asking whether or not the discipline is well-founded and is accurate
and ambitious enough in its knowledge claims. Instead, we are asking about
history and social membership.
The important point to draw from Resnik is that it may very well be a
fool’s errand to try and find some set of conditions which is both necessary
and su cient. The best we may hope for could be to o↵er some kind of
template against which to measure candidates. Drawing on the work of
others, I will propose one template for the empirical sciences here:
1. (Theories) The candidate discipline must propose new theories.
2. (Falsifiability) Theories within the candidate discipline must be able
to make predictions which can be falsified.
3. (Progress) The candidate discipline must be able to show some sort of
progress.
4. (Disambiguation) The candidate discipline should display a history of
disambiguation. In other words, the scope of the field should decrease
over time as it becomes more specialized and as related areas of inquiry
become autonomous.
5. (Lineage) Being a candidate for an empirical science, the discipline
should have roots in some other established (empirical or formal) sci-
ence(s).
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These five conditions together represent a fairly comprehensive set of criteria
which can be used as a template.
The first condition seems obvious; however, it keeps out some disci-
plines which, while being science-adjacent, are nonetheless not rightly sci-
ence. A couple of examples of this are many forms of engineering and clinical
medicine. These disciplines, while certainly involving science, do not neces-
sarily exhibit theory-creation.
The second condition makes sure that the discipline’s theories allow the
right kinds of questions to be asked. Theories within the discipline must be
testable.
The requirement of progress keeps out fields which may have once been
science but are no longer — this makes sense of statements such as “geomet-
ric optics used to be a science, but is now more of an engineering discipline”
(Kuhn, 1996, 79).
Disambiguation, our fourth criterion, makes a somewhat bold normative
claim about science: scientists (like philosophers) should give up problems
they have figured out and those which pose enough new questions to jus-
tify delegating them to autonomous disciplines. Furthermore, when faced
with a seemingly insurmountably complex problem, sub-disciplines should
be created to deal with the intricacies, thus “disambiguating” the field.
Lastly, the requirement of lineage means that for something to rightly
be called science, it must originate from some well-established science, be
that a formal or empirical science.2
2As this is a template for empirical sciences only, we are not faced with a problem
of regress, and can leave the question of where formal sciences are ultimately rooted for
others to answer.
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Of these five criteria, the one which requires the most defense is disam-
biguation. The property of disambiguation is central to the construction of
a scientific field. Disambiguation serves a very practical purpose: it provides
division of labor to the scientific enterprise. Without this property, scientific
fields become unsustainable in a couple of ways. Becoming a practitioner
of an ‘ambiguous’ field could be prohibitive in some cases, as the amount of
knowledge encapsulated by the field is greater, and greater tenacity would
be required if the practitioner is to have more than a shallow understanding.
Furthermore, without disambiguation, factions may develop and practition-
ers might become combative. In a field with such factions, peer review lends
itself to ad hominem attacks and over-critical refereeing.
It is important that within a field of inquiry (at least a field with well-
founded norms), its practitioners agree about the nature of what they are
doing. There could possibly be di↵erent schools of thought on how to carry
out the science, but there should be very little dispute about what the
research program undertakes to investigate.
With this template in hand, we can continue into a brief history of
computer science.
2 A Short History of Computer Science
The question of whether computer science is a science is a misleading one
— it presupposes that a set definition for computer science can be had.
Empirical fields are easier to demarcate because the details of these fields
have already been worked out. For example, it is only because we know
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what it entails to do biology that we can even begin to answer the question
of whether biology is science.
Computer science as a field grew out of mathematics in the late 1930’s
with Alan Turing and Alonzo Church theorizing what is now known as
the Church-Turing thesis.3 This thesis was a mathematical theory about
what is computable by a special class of machines, ‘Turing machines,’ and
it plays a central role in computer science itself. Turing machines describe
with mathematical accuracy a kind of abstract machine which can compute
every function which is computable.
Around the same time, a turing-complete class of machines were be-
ing built independently and with no knowledge about these theoretical ad-
vancements by a man named Konrad Zuse (O’Connor and Robertson, 2012).
Thus, computer science in its formative years was as much the study of the
computing machines themselves as it was a formal science. As such, early
views about the nature of computer science held in one hand the computers
themselves, and in the other what the computers were doing. Quickly, this
situation became untenable as increasing advancements in computing hard-
ware called for some practitioners of computer science to become highly spe-
cialized in computer hardware design. A clean break was obviously needed
between those building the machines and those theorizing about them. The
separate discipline of computer engineering was created to acknowledge this.
Computer scientists were content to tighten their belts and focus mostly on
what was done with computers, requiring perhaps a single computer orga-
nization course of new computer science students.
3For a quick treatment of Turing machines, see (Hagar, 2007, §2).
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Since then, three prevailing views on the nature of computer science have
predominated: that of the computer scientist as rationalist, as empiricist,
and as engineer. This tripartite approach to defining computer science is
recent, although perhaps not in computer science years.4 The approach is
well-documented, and is divisive among many computer scientists (Newell
and Simon, 1976; Eden, 2007). On the whole, these three views make a cou-
ple of claims about computer science: what, specifically, computer scientists
ought to be doing, and the generalization which follows — what the field as a
whole should be accomplishing. While the purposes of these three ‘factions’
are di↵erent, the lines dividing them are not so distinct, and methodolog-
ical distinctions some try to claim exist seem to be confusing at best and
misleading at worst.
So to understand (or begin to understand) what it means to “do” com-
puter science, we should look at what it is modern computer scientists do. In
the next section, I will put forward some ideas about the nature of computer
science. This will help us understand how the three paradigms of computer
science di↵er.
3 Computer Science As Program Theory
Fundamentally, computer science has been the area of study involving the
machines called computers and the programs that are run on them. Early
conceptions of what the field was about reflect this, calling computer science
“the study of the phenomena surrounding computers” (Newell and Simon,
4These are sort of like dog years; the short history of computer science means that just
a few decades span a quarter of the field’s age.
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1976). This view was empirical in the sense that the machines were being
experimented upon — before a new tradesman learns her craft, she must
learn to use her tools. So early computer scientists were, in a sense, studying
the computers themselves — hence the unfortunate naming of computer
science.5
It is not that we have stopped doing this sort of experimentation in
computer science: we have simply started separating out areas of our field
which are becoming fields in their own right. This sort of individuation
happens in many disciplines. The inception of computer science is owed
to mathematics, and already the organization and design of computers has
broken o↵ into the distinct field of computer engineering.
Today, when we say that computer science is an empirical science, we
have a di↵erent meaning. We want to say that when a computer scientist is
doing an experiment, the role of the computer is that of a tool, much like
a microscope. We would not say that a biologist does experiments on her
microscope. Comparisons between computers and microscopes may seem
ludicrous; however, this is only because the machinery and purpose of such
an instrument seems so tangible and is well understood. To make this point
clearer, we need only turn to electron microscopes, as they possess inner
workings that are more abstract and not as well understood by the layperson.
The disparity between the ‘facts’ (details on the order of atoms) and their
representation is now more apparent.6 In much the same way, we would like
to claim there are ‘facts’ that the computer is able to represent. We describe
5Unfortunate in the sense that computer scientists may have started out studying the
computers themselves, but that is no longer truly the case.
6For a thorough treatment of this topic see Hacking (1981).
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a computer as the tool that allows us to access these representations.
So if we consider computers to be the tools, what is it that computer
scientists are studying? In short the answer is that computer scientists study
algorithmic programs and processes. Denning et al. (1989) identify computer
science as “the systematic study of algorithmic processes — their theory,
analysis, design, e ciency, implementation, and application — that describe
and transform information.” The distinction here between ‘program’ and
‘process’ is important. A program is the a priori knowledge about the
process — the blueprint — while the process is that program being run
on some computer.7 With this distinction in hand, we can identify the
rationalist computer scientist:
The rationalist paradigm [...] defines computer science as a
branch of mathematics, treats programs on a par with math-
ematical objects, and seeks certain, a priori knowledge about
their ‘correctness’ by means of deductive reasoning (Eden, 2007,
135).
This satisfies a definition of computer science as being a type of mathe-
matical endeavor. However, most computer scientists would probably agree
that this does not characterize everything which falls under the umbrella of
computer science.
For the (modern) empiricist and what concerns her, the rationalist ap-
proach to computer science is not su cient. Having a priori knowledge
7In much the same way as DNA is the blueprint for biological life. Or, to put it
di↵erently, the program is the equivalent of a fact which the process is a representation
of.
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about a program will not do, for the simple reason that for the types of pro-
grams she studies, full understanding may not exist. These programs are
more akin to theories, and as such, complete knowledge about them cannot
be claimed without experimentation. The programs that empiricists exper-
iment with are generally descriptive in nature: they might describe some
natural process or simulate some system. So, in this way, the empiricist is
interested in processes, not only the programs that describe them. Eden
provides this definition for the empiricist:
The scientific paradigm [...] defines computer science as a nat-
ural (empirical) science, takes programs to be entities on a par
with mental processes, and seeks a priori and a posteriori knowl-
edge about them by combining formal deduction and scientific
experimentation (Eden, 2007, 135).
In this definition, the scientific paradigm seems to be a sort of superset
of the rationalist paradigm. However, I would amend Eden’s definition to
be more precise about what it is empiricist computer scientists study. In
addition to being interested in programs, computer scientists in the scientific
paradigm study processes. Eden acknowledges this by asserting that they
“take programs to be entities on a par with mental processes”; however, it is
not the program itself by means of which empiricists do experiments, rather
it is the process that is created by running the program.
Of course, the separation between empiricist and rationalist is not great
— it is expected that each is well acquainted with the other. At the same
time, sub-fields usually exhibit proclivity for one paradigm over another.
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For example, computer scientists doing work in artificial intelligence, while
certainly employing rationalist methods, operate empirically. The systems
being built are usually complex and hinge on theories of intelligence for
which there is little or no a priori knowledge. Theoretical computer science,
on the other hand, is one of the few sub-fields within computer science which
fully satisfies the rationalist paradigm and shows few signs of the other two.
Almost all of the work done in theoretical computer science is done by way of
formal proofs, and it easily may be the case that some theoretical computer
scientists need not write a single line of code.
4 Verification - A Sticking Point
This brings us to program verification, which is a common thread throughout
computer science: no matter which paradigm we look at, we can find some
idea or other about how verification should be carried out. Verification, as
we will use the term, is the attempt to verify a program’s correctness. This,
in turn, brings to light the question: what does it mean for a program to be
correct?
Initially, we can define a program to be correct i↵ all inputs to the
program result in correct outputs. However, this definition is problematic:
its very statement is circular. All output of some program is sure to be
correct in relation to its input for the program as it is written. In other
words, assuming the program is valid, any errors made when writing it may
change the output; however, the output will still be correct in relation to
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the program itself.8
Surely, this is not what we mean when we say a program is correct,
so what really makes some output correct given its associated input? We
answer this by saying that the output of some program is correct in relation
to the given input i↵ the program as specified would generate that output.9
For this reason, program correctness is a nebulous concept at best — the
correctness of a program lies in how well the specification of that program
corresponds to the implementation of it. To put it another way:
(Correct) A program is correct i↵ for each input X we get ex-
pected output E.
As the prevailing view of program verification among philosophers of
computer science goes, a demarcating feature of rationalists and empiricists
is how they go about verifying programs. The rationalist seeks formal proofs
to verify the correctness of programs. They try to show mathematically
that as it is written a program serves its intended purpose. Empiricists,
on the other hand, verify programs through experimentation — a program
accepting some input is written, and then run and checked against expected
output. Its correctness is a measure of how well its actual output corresponds
to its expected output.
The main argument against formal verification is the monumental di -
culty of proving a non-trivial program formally correct. Another objection
8I take a valid program to be one with no syntactical errors. In other words, it compiles
(if written in a compiled language) or runs (if the language is interpreted).
9When we talk about a program as it is specified, or the specifications for some program,
we are talking about the ‘plans’ or purpose of that program. In other words, program
specifications are a description of what the program is supposed to do. If the program as
written corresponds to its specifications, we call that program correct.
14
comes from Colburn (1991, 2003) where he argues that there is an inher-
ent flaw in the rationalist method of verification. The adequacy of formally
proving a program correct rests on the assumption of the formal correct-
ness of all subsystems a↵ecting the program in question. A formally verified
program is only proven to be correct on an ideal machine. In reality, the
program relies on expected behavior in subsystems, which, unless exhaus-
tively verified by separate formal verification proofs, means that incorrect
assumptions were used in the higher-level proof. Bugs in underlying soft-
ware systems and glitches in hardware might result in unforeseen behavior
in a formally proven program.
These objections, in my mind, are pragmatic in nature. They say nothing
against the validity of formal verification. No method of verification guards
entirely against unforeseen material flaws in hardware. Furthermore, given
enough resources, we could theoretically have an entirely formally verified
system on which to run formally verified programs. This, of course, would
not be practical, but it serves to illustrate the validity of formal proofs.
Because such a system does not exist, this objection simply points out the
infeasible but not impossible nature of them.
A bigger problem is that of ‘specification verification.’ Given some spec-
ification for a program which we are verifying against, what assurance do
we have that the specification itself is correct? In other words, how do we
verify a specification? Is it even possible to verify program specifications
without falling into some sort of regress? Any error in the specification of
some program will result in a formally-verified program which exhibits be-
havior we probably did not want. In this way, it seems futile to attempt to
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prove the correctness of any program.
An empiricist, on the other hand, seeks to verify her programs using
experiments. This can be attributed to the nature of the programs being
written — generally, some sort of external system or process is being mod-
eled. Usually these systems are natural. For example, a computer scientist
looking to examine theories about the human visual system would write a
program to simulate the particulars of the di↵erent theories under examina-
tion. The rationalist approach to program verification will not work here,
since in this case the computer scientist does not know if her specification is
correct as far as the system is concerned. The only means of verification in
this situation is that of designing an experiment on the program and some
input, and gauging the results against what we expect.
Of course, computer scientists need not be empiricists in just this natu-
ralistic way; there are other systems which are empirically verified by com-
puter scientists. Examples of this are database systems: although they are
grounded in solid theory, the properties of them are empirically verified.
Here is where computer science as an engineering discipline becomes
relevant. A parallel between the empiricist’s method of verification and the
engineer’s reliability test can be drawn here. In fact, reliability tests are
analogous to verification in software engineering. Opinions di↵er on this,
however, and the high road is often given to the empiricists. Eden argues
that there is a clear distinction between reliability tests and experiments.
He describes the distinction:
The purpose of a reliability test is to establish the extent to
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which a program meets the needs of its users, whereas a scientific
experiment is designed to corroborate (or refute) a particular
hypothesis. (Eden, 2007, 155)
I would argue that Eden is drawing a line in the sand where there should be
none: just because the expected output comes from users instead of some
other source does not mean the engineer and scientist are doing something
di↵erent. They are still verifying program correctness, just based on dif-
ferent criteria. In fact the methods by which the empiricists and engineers
of computer science verify program correctness are more similar than dis-
similar. Reliability tests are di↵erent sorts of experiments, but experiments
nonetheless. In the same way that the empiricist does not know if her pro-
gram is correct in relation to the system it models, the engineer does not
truly know if her program “meets the needs of its users,” but the program’s
output might still be unexpected.
This has traditionally been how philosophers characterize the argument
over verification, but the actual state of a↵airs has been misrepresented.
Very few computer scientists buy into formal verification full-throttle. In-
stead, they seek to verify certain aspects of programs. For example, certain
languages have what is called typing — this means that the type of data held
in variables is specified when the program is written. Programs with this
quality (often called strongly-typed languages) have the nice property that
certain kinds of errors can be caught before runtime. Another property we
may want to verify is that all paths of execution are reachable in the program
— any unreachable path can be optimized out, thus allowing the program to
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be more space-e cient. Such properties are almost never verified by hand.
Whenever computer scientists talk about formal verification they are almost
certainly referencing some form of automated formal verifier or other. An
example of such a verifier is ACL2, which is “A Computational Logic for
Applicative Common Lisp.” This system allows the computer scientist to
write a LISP program, write properties (as LISP programs themselves), and
ACL2 will prove that theorems hold.10 In general, when computer scientists
talk of formal verification, they mean that they can formally verify certain
properties about a program. This is an important distinction because for-
mal verification as understood by computer scientists is not incompatible
with the type of verification proposed by empiricists. In this way, more of
what computer scientists do can be accounted for without needing compet-
ing views about verification: empiricists can make use of these automated
tools in addition to their empirical methods of verification.
5 Applying Demarcation to Computer Science




10Some other formal verifiers include:
SPIN – verification of concurrent systems / programs
Coq – theorem proving system with extraction




Until this point, I have argued for an empirical view of computer science,
one which incorporates elements from the formal paradigm. My next task
is to apply the template for an empirical science I constructed in the first
section, and see how well it fits.
Do computer scientists come up with theories? The answer to this ques-
tion is somewhat hard to see. Experiments are conducted and hypotheses
tested, so there must be some sort of underlying theories. The Church-
Turing thesis is the central theory of computer science, and there are many
theories which lie tangential to that one. These theories allow computer
scientists to make predictions and design experiments which can be used to
test theories and possibly falisify them — and so computer science easily
satisfies the requirement for falsifiability. Progress is perhaps the easiest
to see — the rapid pace of advancements over the span of the field’s history
points to progress.
Disambiguation is the first of our principles which poses a prima facie
problem. The problem is easy to see upon examination: the simple fact that
there is more than one paradigm (each with staunch supporters) that com-
puter scientists align themselves with means that computer science as a field
is not adequately disambiguated. We have, so far, listed three paradigms:
that of the rationalist, empiricist, and engineer. Further, we have argued
for the empiricist view over the formal one, and shown that as far as is
necessary we can incorporate many, and perhaps all, of the formal concepts
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within the empiricist paradigm. Talk of the engineer, however, has been
spare. This is because it is here that the di↵erences cannot be reconciled —
it seems we must simply choose one over the other. The goal of the engineer
is too di↵erent from that of the empiricist or rationalist — for him, computer
science is a much di↵erent endeavor. The engineering of software solutions
is his primary goal, not the advancement of knowledge in the field. While
no normative claim is being made, these two paradigms being interwoven is
harmful to computer science as a whole.
This is not a new problem, and computer science is not the first field to
have faced such a crisis. Fields such as biology and chemistry have faced
a similar situation, and both have resolved it by di↵erentiating separate
sub-fields, such as bioinformatics, genetics, biochemistry, and flavor chem-
istry. Computer science itself has already done this once with computer en-
gineering, physics with many engineering disciplines, math with computer
science. For computer science to truly disambiguate itself, it must separate
out software engineering as a distinct discipline. Eden presents a normative
argument for separating software engineering, claiming that many ‘hard’
computer science classes are being dropped from educational programs in
favor of software engineering-oriented classes (Eden, 2007). His concern is
that keeping the engineering paradigm within computer science will cause
the field to shift away from making the sort of scientific progress it can.
Our last principle, that of lineage, is easily satisfied. The conception
of computer science took place within mathematics in the 1930’s with the
question of what was and was not a computable function. Much of the
opposition to thinking of computer science as a science stems from this
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lineage, as it is harder to see how a discipline with formal roots can be an
empirical science. But as the formal aspects of computer science become
more a part of the toolset and less the main focus of research, the practice
of computer science comes to resemble an empirical science more and more.
6 Importance of Curriculum
Scientists are not born — they are shaped, at least in part, by their ed-
ucation. This is something many scientists perhaps lose sight of — that
although science is not only method, forming good habits helps determine
the quality of the scientist. This is not a new idea — Thomas Kuhn calls this
part of the disciplinary matrix, and attributes much of a scientist’s success
to her education (Kuhn, 1996). This disciplinary matrix is a specific aspect
of Kuhn’s more general paradigm, and it indicates the entire scope of a field:
the education, practice, and basis for that discipline.11
It is important, then, that the curriculum of undergraduate “future scien-
tists” reflect what the end product is meant to be — a well-trained scientist
who is able to operate within the disciplinary matrix of her field. Computer
science, with software engineering included (sometimes even being the fo-
cus) in the curriculum of many undergraduate programs, undermines this
goal. Just as with computer engineering, only a single software engineering
course should be required of students. Some schools have already separated
11Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm denotes much more than what I have been using the word
‘paradigm’ to indicate. It indicates not only a way of looking at some aspect of the world
(as it relates to a discipline), but a way that is incommensurable with its predecessors.
Kuhn’s paradigm is too broad for discussion here, so my use of the word will be roughly
analogous to Kuhn’s disciplinary matrix.
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out software engineering as a separate area of study, allowing those not
interested so much in the ‘science’ to focus on aspects of software design.
7 Conclusion
Before we can identify computer science as being a science or not, we must
first demarcate computer science from computer engineering and software
engineering. Computer science must disambiguate; software engineering
should be completely separated out as a distinct yet related discipline. Not
only are there philosophical and scientific reasons for doing this, there are
strong normative reasons as well. Software engineering is an integral part of
society and is the most practical application of the many discoveries made
in computer science. Keeping it intertwined with computer science does a
disservice to both disciplines.
The damage done to computer science by watered-down curriculum is
much greater than to software engineering, however. Software engineer-
ing, being so readily applicable, lucrative, and in such demand means that
computer science departments which haven’t yet made this distinction have
begun supplanting the bread-and-butter courses of computer science with
software engineering courses which rightly belong in another major.
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